

# X-Raying Public Sector Corruption (PSC) In Nigeria: A Case Study



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# QUOTE



“Corruption will continue to thrive until justice systems can punish wrongdoing and keep governments in check... Leaders should fully invest in and guarantee the independence of institutions that uphold the law and tackle corruption. It is time to end impunity for corruption”

**François Valérien**  
**Chair, Transparency International**

# □ Background





- ❖ Corruption incidence at the global level is rising.
- ❖ Specifically, the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) confirms the rising corruption scourge across the globe with over two-thirds of countries scoring below 50 out of 100.



# CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2023

The perceived levels of public sector corruption in 180 countries/territories around the world.



\*The categories employed in this presentation or map are for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute a legal opinion or any other form of professional advice. The data is for informational purposes only and should not be used for legal or other purposes.

#CPI2023

[www.transparency.org/cpi](http://www.transparency.org/cpi)

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**Figure 1: Global 2023 Corruption Perception Index**  
**Source: Transparency International, 2023 Corruption Perception Report**



- ❖ With respect to SSA, the 2023 CPI shows that ninety per cent of the countries scores below 50, maintaining the lowest average at 33 out of 100.
- ❖ The top three performers in the region are Seychelles (71), Cabo Verde (64) and Botswana (59), while Equatorial Guinea (17), South Sudan (13) and Somalia (11) are the lowest three performers. See Figure 2 below.




Figure 2: Summary of SSAs 2023 CPI Performance

Source: Transparency International, 2023 Corruption Perception Report



- ❖ What differs basically is the depth, veracity and the political as well as the popular willingness to deal with it headlong. Why?
- ❖ The difference in perception of what Public Service is, by the elected and bureaucratic officials as well as the citizens.
- ❖ Public Service as an opportunity to serve the CITIZENS versus Public Service as a means of ‘Wealth Accumulation’ for self – Working For Your Pocket (WFYP).
- ❖ A 1947 Colonial Government Report (CGR) averred thus:  
“The African’s background and outlook on public morality is very different from that of the present day Briton...**The African in the public service seeks to further his own financial interest.**”



# □ Definition of Concept

## ❖ Public Sector Corruption

➤ Definition varies.

✓ However, against the backdrop of the various definitions of corruption, one can conclude that it is simply:

“the use of governmental positions and their institutional/administrative apparatuses and instruments for the advancement of personal or sectional benefits, at the expense of the CITIZENS thereby conferring improper benefits contrary to legal and moral norms”.

❖ Unfortunately, attention is always focused only on money. It goes beyond that.

# Context



“If we do not kill corruption, corruption will kill Nigeria,”  
Former President Muhammadu Buhari (May, 2015)

- ❖ Nigeria’s Corruption Index between 1996 and 2023 averaged 21.48 points reaching an all-time high of 28.00 points in 2016 and a record low of 6.90 points in 1996. ( See Figure 2 below).
- ❖ Specifically, the 2023 CPI rating shows that Nigeria scored 25 points out of 100.




Figure 2: Nigeria CPI Performance 2012 - 2023.





## ❖ **The NBS/UNODC Report (2024):**

- “In 2023, Nigerian public officials received nothing less than N721 billion (US \$1.26 billion), amounting to about 0.35 per cent of Nigeria’s GDP”.
- An estimated 87 million bribes were paid in 2023, (compare to 117 million estimated in 2019) – the equivalent of an average of 0.8 bribe per each adult.
- The decrease was due to decrease in number of adult population that had at least one contact with a public official in 2023 which was 56% as against 63% in 2019.
- In 2023, 34% of citizens in contact with officials paid a bribe or were asked to pay bribe.

## ❖ **Price Water House Cooper (2016):**

- Forecasted that corruption in Nigeria could cost up to 37% of GDP by 2030. The cost is equated to around \$1,000 per person in 2014 and nearly \$2,000 per person by 2030.

# Annals of Public Service Corruption in Nigeria (1906-2023)



“It would be impossible and, even if possible, of little value to attempt a comprehensive picture of the types and scope of corruption in Nigeria...

Corruption has grown enormously in variety, magnitude and brazenness ...”

Prof. Chinua Achebe

“The Trouble with Nigeria” (1983)

## ❖ When Did The Journey Start?

➤ It is being a long time coming: 1906 – till date

➤ The Annals of PSC in Nigeria is summarised in Table 1 below.

# Table 1: Annals of Public Sector Corruption

- **1906 - 1919:** The warrant chiefs in the South and Emirs in the North became notorious for bribery and corruption.
- **1947:** A Colonial Government Report (CGR) averred thus: “The African’s background and outlook on public morality is very different from that of the present day Briton. The African in the public service seeks to further his own financial interest.”
- **1954:** Igbo-Etiti District Council scandal, the report noted “a systematic corruption in the award of contracts and promotion of staff.
- **1954:** The Foster-Sutton Tribunal investigated & found the Premier of the Eastern Region, Nnamdi Azikiwe guilty. Zik’s conduct was considered as “falling short of expectations of honest and reasonable people.”
- **1960-66 (Balewa government):** Government officials looted public funds with impunity. Precisely, Chief Festus Okotie Eboh in defence of his accusation of corruption quoted from the Holy Bible that: To those that have, more shall be given...”
- **1962:** The Coker Commission of Inquiry found Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the first Premier of the Western Region culpable for the ills of the Western Region Marketing Board, due to his failure to adhere to the standards of conduct, which were required of persons holding public office.
- “By the end of 1965, the politicians had earned almost contempt for their corruption, profligacy and lack of real concern for those they ruled and who had elected them.” (Michael Crowther).
- corruption was the main reason given by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu for staging the first coup d’etat in Nigeria’s political history
- **1966-1975 (General Yakubu Gowon’s administration):** Assets Investigation Panel probed governors and other public officers that served under Gowon. The Panel not only indicted 10 out of the 12 military governors whose assets were subsequently confiscated, but, also retire and dismissed more than 10,000 public servants nationwide. The Cement Amanda scandal comes to the fore
- **1975-1976 (General Murtala administration):** Successful anti-Corruption Crusade
- **1976-1979 (General Obasanjo administration):** was accused of massive corruption before handing over to the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in October, 1979.
- **1979-1983 (Shehu Shagari’s administration):** This period was marked by fragrant abuse of power by virtually all public officers—career and political office holders The Paul Omu–led tribunal found most of the politicians guilty and sentenced them to long jail terms.
- **1983 – 1985 (Major-General Muhammed Buhari administration):** The regime was determined to eradicate corruption. It immediately launched the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) crusade.
- **1985 – 1993 (Babangida administration):** There was a general consensus that corruption not only reached an alarming levels but became institutionalised under his watch.
- **1993-1998 (General Sani Abacha–led administration):** The menace of public looting took a turn for the worst with wanton greed, impunity and total disregard for the rule of law. It was alleged that General Abacha and his family as well as his associates looted the treasury with reckless abandon. As at 2023, the Nigeria government has cumulatively recovered about \$5 billion. (Punch News Paper, 2023).
- **1998-1999 (General Abubakar Abdusalam administration):** Investigation revealed that he made a mockery of any sense of discipline and probity at a scale that practically made saints of his predecessors. For instance, The panel of investigation submitted that the 4,072 contracts cost Nigeria N635.62 billion as against the N88 billion budgeted in 1998, representing a deficit of N551 billion. Also, the foreign reserve, which at the end of 1998 stood at US\$7.6 billion shrank to US\$3.8 billion by May 1999.
- **1999 – 2007 (General Obasanjo second coming):** He attempted to strengthen existing anti-graft laws but by establishing two key anti-corruption institutions; ICPC (2001) and EFCC (2003). Unfortunately, these anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) made little impact in the war against corruption. Specifically, some western diplomats were of the opinion that Nigeria lost between US\$4 billion and US\$8 billion annually to corruption during the 8 years of Obasanjo’s regime.
- **2007 -2010 (President Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua’s government):** Started well but finished poorly. The Ibori saga and the sack of Ribadu – EFCC chair marred his anti-corruption stance
- **2010 – 2015 (President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan administration):** His regime was marred by monumental corruption cases. Such as the issue of 45,000 ghost workers found on the federal govt payroll who are being paid N100 billion yearly and the popular oil subsidy scam
- **2015-2023 (President Buhari administration second coming):** At the end of his 8 years tenure, there was a general consensus that he did not leave up to his pre-election campaign promise to fight corruption. it became fashionable for politicians and other PEPs with monumental corruption cases with the ACAs, to simply jump boat from whatever party they belong to and join the ruling party, and ‘all their sins were forgiven’. The most devastating blow to his corruption war was the State pardon granted to two convicted former governors - who were serving jail terms. The catch phrase ‘fantastically corrupt’ was also synonymous to his regime.

# ❑ Drivers of Public Sector Corruption



- ❖ Generally, key drivers of PSC can be divided into two broad categories:
  - **Global:** At the global level, the main drivers include globalisation, multi-national corporations (MNCs), Bilateral and Multi-lateral agencies, Regional blocs as well as foreign countries with specific economic interest.
  - **National:** At the national level, the major drivers of corruption include the organized Private Sector (OPS), political office holders and PEPs, Agencies of government across the three tiers and arms of government, religious bodies, traditional institutions, NGOs, CSOs, etc.
- ❖ Dada (2015) categorised the forces that drives corruption into **institutional, human, legal, culture and religion forces.**

# Table 2: Drivers of Public Sector Corruption



## Human

- ✓ Limited capacity, knowledge, skills and attitude
- ✓ Acceptance of unethical practices as norm.
- ✓ Negative worldview/Perception such as If you can't beat them, join them mentality.
- ✓ Ingenuity of system operators
- ✓ The collusion theory
- ✓ Followers perception of public office/public service
- ✓ Citizens haplessness perception of the corruption scourge

## Legal

- ✓ Failure to outline and enforce limit of political and personal influence
- ✓ Ambiguous and weak legal framework
- ✓ Poor criminal Justice System
- ✓ Slow justice process

## Institutional

- ✓ Weak Institutions
- ✓ Poor recruitment process
- ✓ Inadequate knowledgeable human resource base without requisite knowledge and skills.
- ✓ Duplication of agencies
- ✓ Inadequate funding
- ✓ Opaque process/procedures
- ✓ Ineffective monitoring and evaluation
- ✓ Failure to state and enforce basic organisation integrity/ethic principles.
- ✓ Sacred cow or the untouchable syndrome

## Culture

- ✓ Society's values, ethics, beliefs and worldview
- ✓ Changing societal ethical and moral values

## Religion

- ✓ Import of religion
- ✓ Miracle mentality
- ✓ Perception of God as 'money doubler'





# □ Approaches To Fighting Public Sector Corruption

- ❖ The approaches at addressing PSC can be divided into two:
  - ✓ Ad-hoc approach and institutional approach.
- ❖ **Ad-hoc focused Approach:** Prior to 2001, the approach was basically through the use of Panels of Enquiries/Investigation or Tribunals using a number of scattered laws, rules and regulations.
- ❖ **Institutional focused Approach:** From 2001, - the Third Republic - deliberate attempt was made to set up anti-corruption institutions such as the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission-(EFCC), the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), The Public Complaints Commission, The Office of the Auditor-General of the Federation, and the Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms (TUGAR). Anti-Corruption and Transparency Units (ACTUs) in the MDAs.



## □ Appraisal of Performance

- ❖ Generally, for any public policy to be seen as successful, it must be effective, efficient, innovative, and feasible both politically and administratively – this is applicable to PSC war. (Enweremadu, 2021).
- ❖ However, the Human Right Watch (HRW) in 2011, opined that the most effective and efficient assessment of anti-corruption efforts of any regime is simply by looking at the number of corruption convictions secured against Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) - high-ranking politicians and Bureaucrats alike.
- ❖ Therefore, based on HRW submission above, attempt was made to appraise the impact of the fight against PSC in Nigeria, over the period 2010 - 2024 by focusing on the performance of the EFCC using its PEPs conviction and assets recovery rate as well as yearly CPI rating over the same period.

**Table 3: EFCC Operational Performance (2010-2024)**

Year	No of Petitions Received	No Investigated	No of Cases Filed In Court	Convictions Secured	Recovery	No of Cases Lost
2010	6782	2399	206	68	n.a.	n.a.
2011	7,737	2,606	417	67		
2012	4,914	2,062	502	87		
2013	6,089	2,883	485	117		
2014	4,941	2,512	388	126		
2015	5,979	2,662	462	103	794,000,000,000.00	n.a.
2016	7,045	4,660	390	195		
2017	8,251	5,662	501	189		
2018	9,566	5,795	515	312		
2019	12,644	8,729	1,901	1,280		
2020*	10,152	7,340	1,305	865	Not Specified	
2021	n.a	n.a	n.a.	2,220	n.a.	34
2022	n.a	n.a	n.a.	3,785	134,337,759,574.00	41
2023	14,000	n.a	n.a	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
May 29, 2023 – May 29, 2024	14,000 (June, 2023 – June, 2024)			3,175	156,276,691,242.30	n.a.
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>73,948</b>	<b>39,970</b>	<b>5,767</b>	<b>11,724</b>		

**Sources:** Author’s compilation from various sources: (a) EFCC official sits [www.efccnigeria.org](http://www.efccnigeria.org); (b) CISLAC (2021): Asset Recovery: Nigeria’s Story of Small Progress; (c) Journals; (d) Various Newspapers Reports; & (e) Various online materials

**Table 4: Government Assets Recovery 1999-2023**

S/N	Government	Foreign Asset Recovery	Local Asset Recovery
1	President Obasanjo, 1999 - 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ \$1.2 billion; Switzerland (2002)</li> <li>▪ \$149 million; Jersey Island, UK (2003)</li> <li>▪ \$500 million; Switzerland (2004)</li> <li>▪ \$458 million; Switzerland (2005)</li> </ul>	No record available
2	President Goodluck Jonathan, 2010 - 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ \$1 billion; Switzerland (2012)</li> <li>▪ \$380 million; Switzerland (2015)</li> <li>▪ \$227 million; Liechtenstein (2014)</li> <li>▪ \$48 million; the United States (2014)</li> </ul>	No record of recovery
3	President Muhammadu Buhari, 2015 - Date	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ \$322 million; Switzerland (2017)</li> <li>▪ 4.2 million pounds, UK (2020)</li> <li>▪ \$311m; Bailiwick of Jersey, US (2020)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ \$100 million recovered on behalf of Nigerian Port Authority by EFCC;</li> <li>▪ 53 billion Naira recovered for the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria;</li> <li>▪ \$43 million security funds from an apartment in Ikoyi;</li> <li>▪ 189 billion Naira recovered by ICPC, MDAs' personnel cost from 2019 to 2020.</li> <li>▪ 2 billion Naira, ICPC on constituency Projects covering 2015 to 2018</li> </ul>

**Source:** CISLAC (2021): Asset Recovery: Nigeria's Story of Small Progress



- ❖ Given the level of conviction and recovery shown in tables 1 and 2 above, it is very convenient to conclude that the institutionalised approach as epitomized by the EFCC is performing creditably well and by implication conclude that the fight against PEPs' was effective.
- ❖ However, contrary to this expectation, many Nigerians believe that the anti-corruption war is ineffective. What explains this contradiction?
- ❖ The simple explanation for the contradiction is hinged on the poor performance of the EFCC with respect to high-profile corruption cases – the PEPs'.
- ❖ A closer look at the convictions secured by the EFCC shows that the conviction rate of the Commission only increased due to the nature of the financial crimes that the EFCC investigated during this period.





- ❖ In other words, almost 90% of the conviction are basically what can be referred to as 'small criminal' made up of the 419ers, the popular yahoo boys, internet scammers, etc.
- ❖ Only a fraction – about 5% - represent PEPs who are likely to be members of the opposition parties.
- ❖ Furthermore, If the figures above are juxtapose against the abysmal ranking of Nigeria by both international, regional and local organisations including the Transparency International within the same period as highlighted in Figure 2 above, it is obvious that irrespective of the various initiatives, strategies and tools used in the nation's efforts at fighting Public Sector corruption, by successive government since independence, one can conclude that Nigeria government anti-graft initiative, has not achieved the required result, neither has it made the desired impact.

# A Snippet of Some High Profile PSC Corruption Cases



- ✓ Beta Edu (former Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Poverty Alleviation) accused of misappropriating N585 million (2024)
- ✓ Sadiya Umar Farouq, (former Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development), accused of misappropriating N27.4 billion.(2024)
- ✓ Olu Agunloye (former Minister for Power and Steel Development), accused of fraudulent contract award and official corruption to the tune of \$6 billion (2023).
- ✓ Ms. Stella Oduah (former Minister for Aviation), accused of fraud, money laundry, conspiracy and maintaining anonymous bank account to the tune of \$5 billion. (2022)
- ✓ Opakunle Oluomo, impeached former speaker of Ogun State House of Assembly, accused of fraud to the tune of N2.5 billion (2024yr)
- ✓ Former Gov. Yahaya Bello of Kogi State declared wanted over allegation of embezzling N80 billion from the State (2024)
- ✓ Godwin Emefiele, (ex-CBN Governor) on trial for allegedly stealing \$4.5 billion dollars and about N2.8 billion (2024).

**Table 5: A Snippet of Some High Profile PSC Corruption Cases**

S/ N	Cases	Charges	Start date	Status	in 2023
1.	Col. Sambo Dasuki	Diversion & misappropriation	December 2015	On-going	
2.	Justice Adeniyi Ademola	Bribery	Dec. 2016	Acquitted	
3.	Mr. James Ngilari	Contravention of Procurement Law	Sept. 2016	Acquitted	
4.	Mr. Timipre Sylva	Money laundering and fraud	May 2015	Ongoing	
5.	Mrs. Patience Jonathan	Money laundering	Sept. 2016	Ongoing	
6.	Mr. Mike Ozekhome	Money laundering	2017	Acquitted	
7.	Mr. Ikedi Ohakim	Money laundering	July 2015	Ongoing	
8.	Sule Lamido	Graft and money laundering	September 2015	Ongoing	
9.	Murtala Nyako	Money Laundering	2015	Ongoing	
10.	Olisa Metuh	Money Laundering	Jan. 2016	Ongoing	
11.	Patrick Akpobolokemi	Conversion of public fund	Dec. 2015	Ongoing	
12.	Mr. Stephen Oronsaye	Diversion of funds	March. 2016	Acquitted	
13.	Jolly Nyame	Embezzlement of state funds	May 2007	Convicted	
14.	Joseph Nwobike	Bribery and corruption	2018	Acquitted	
15.	Willie Obiano	Misappropriation of public fund	2022	On-going	
16.	Abdulrasheed Maina	Misappropriation of public fund	2019	Convicted	
17.	Farouq Lawan	Bribe	2012	Convicted	
18.	Abdulaziz Yari	Misappropriation of public fund	2021	On-going	
19.	Theodore Orji	Misappropriation	2021	On-going	
20	Tanko Al-Makura	Breach of trust & misappropriation	2021	On-going	
21	Godswill Akpabio	Bribery & misappropriation	2015, 2021	On-going	
22	Aliyu Wamakko	Mismanagement & abuse of office.	2019	On-going	
23	Ali Modu Sheriff	Embezzlement & misappropriation	2015	On-going	
24	Rabiu Kwankwaso	misappropriation	2021	On-going	
25	Godwim Emeziele	Embezzlement & misappropriation	2023	On-going	
26.	13 ex-governors' & some former ministers (N853.8billion)	Embezzlement and misappropriation	2024	On-going	



## ❑ Results of On-going Fight Against PSC

- The impact of the anti-corruption war can be viewed as both positive and negative:
- **Positive:**
  - ✓ To the extent that these agencies have brought to light the depth and veracity of PSC, especially as it relates to the rising number of public officials – either political or bureaucratic – not only being investigated but being prosecuted for corruption across the various tiers of government.
- **Negative:**
  - ✓ It is instructive to state that despite the establishment of various anti-graft agencies, there has been a steady rise in the PSC incidences across the various tiers of government.
  - ✓ Infact from historical fact, PSC under each successive government seems to get worse than under its predecessors.



## ❑ Lessons

### ❖ Necessary & Sufficient Conditions:

- ✓ The existence of institutions, laws, rules, policies and regulations are a necessary but not a sufficient condition to either eliminate or reduce PSCs.

### ❖ Perception of Solution:

- ✓ There can never be a one size fit-all solutions to address PSC menace

### ❖ Immunity Clause:

- ✓ The existence and non-distinction between administrative immunity and immunity from criminal conduct remains an albatross.

### ❖ Limited Understanding of the Corruption Theories:

- ✓ There is limited understanding of the theoretical construct underpinning corruption





## ❑ Lessons...

### ❖ **Non-adoption of Strategy to Local Fit:**

- ✓ The tendency to cut and paste without adapting to local peculiarities.

### ❖ **Constitutional Ambiguity and Loopholes:**

- ✓ The existence of constitutional ambiguity and loopholes constitute a big draw back to the fight against PSC

### ❖ **Limited Internal Institutional Capacity and Synergies:**

- ✓ There exist limited internal institutional capacity and synergies as well as high level of mutual distrust among ACAs

### ❖ **Poor Public Trust:**

- ✓ There is a perception that anti-graft war is selective and is being used as a political tool or witch-hunt.



## ❖ **Non-existence of ‘Draconian Punishment’**

- ✓ Albeit in the mode of the Asian Tigers

## ❖ **Marathon versus Sprint**

- ✓ The wrong perception that the fight against PSC is a sprint rather than a marathon.

## ❖ **Integrity Check**

- ✓ Non-existence/Inadquate modalities for conducting mandatory ‘Integrity Check’ on all public sector employee – political and Bureaucratic alike.

## ❖ **Application of Soft-landing/Political Solution**

- ✓ The selective application of ‘soft-landing/‘political solution’ for politically exposed persons (PEPs) is contributing to worsening PSC.



## ❖ **Limited Support from the Elites:**

✓ There is very limited Elite support or Elite consensus for anti-graft war

## ❖ **Poor Programme Design:**

✓ From programme design perspective, there is over-large “design-reality gaps”, minimal actual focus on the “missing middle” - the interventions themselves -, as well as poor attention given to cultural basics.

## ❖ **Political Interference**

✓ Political interference and protection of PEPs from prosecution as well as granting them underserved state pardons is rubbishing anti-graft war.

## ❖ **Poor Legal Framework & Non-workability of other Initiatives:**

✓ The Freedom of Information legal framework and the whistle blower initiative are not working.

# Reasons for the Failure of Anti-Graft Initiative to Address PSC

Table 6: Reasons for the Failure of Anti-Graft Initiative to Address PSC

Mistakes typically attributed to donors	Mistakes typically attributed to governments	Mistakes shared between donors and governments	Mistakes attributed to the implementation itself
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reforms reduced to technical changes in “governance”, based on principal-agent theory, politics of reform overlooked</li> <li>- Corruption perceived as a generic problem – recommendations vary little from one society to another</li> <li>- Approaches imposed from outside</li> <li>- Time frames for change are unrealistic: focus on immediate over meaningful reform</li> <li>- Incentives to change are not addressed</li> <li>- Overambitious</li> <li>- Lack of context sensitivity</li> <li>- Over funding and pressure to disburse</li> <li>- Reluctance to intervene in domestic [political] affairs</li> <li>- Weak accountability of donors to partners,</li> <li>- Over-reliance on NGOs - to the detriment of both state institutions and community involvement</li> <li>- Too little attention on the “supply side” – developed country firms.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lack of political will</li> <li>- Lack of local ownership</li> <li>- Unrealistic, no resources attached</li> <li>- Plans being undifferentiated laundry list of reforms</li> <li>- Fragmentation and depletion of responsibilities</li> <li>- Failure to institutionalize reforms</li> <li>- Failure to deliver quick wins</li> <li>- Too dependent on law enforcement</li> <li>- Targeting only middle ranking officials</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Inadequate focus on outcomes</li> <li>- Defensiveness and lack of transparency</li> <li>- Poor supervision of projects</li> <li>- Poor coordination</li> <li>- Tendency to rely on external experts</li> <li>- Corruption and governance seen as a “sector” and not mainstreamed</li> <li>- Focus on just one reform area (like Anti-Corruption Agencies)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Too few actors involved in interventions</li> <li>- Low level of long term partnership</li> <li>- No indicators for measuring outcomes and impact</li> <li>- Ill-conceived time frames</li> </ul>

# Challenges of Anti-Graft War



- ❖ Eweremadu (2021), came up with what is referred to as the ‘seven sins’ to ACAs effectiveness. They are:
  - ✓ ‘Economic sins’, or lack of resources;
  - ✓ ‘Political sins’, or absence of political will;
  - ✓ ‘Legal sins’, or inefficient legal system;
  - ✓ ‘Organisational sins’, or leadership weakness such as lack of independence and poor administrative style;
  - ✓ ‘Governance sins’, or lack or effective complementary institutions such as the police;
  - ✓ ‘Performance sins’, or level of efficiency; and
  - ✓ ‘Public confidence sins’, or lack of public trust and confidence
- ❖ Dada (2015) broadly categorised these challenges into human, institutional, process, legal, finance, political, and culture as shown in Table 7 below.

**Table 7: Challenges Facing Anti-Graft Initiatives**Human

- Inadequate skilled manpower
- Limited powers
- Poor motivation
- Inadequate training
- Non-meritocracy based recruitment system.
- Poor investigation and prosecution capacity

Cultural

- Declining moral and ethical standards
- Modernisation of living life style (Every man for himself mentality)

Process

- Coordination challenges between the anti-corruption agencies
- Opaque SOPs, rules and processes
- Poor Communication
- Implementation challenges
- Absence of a comprehensive database
- Non-synchronisation of PSR across the different tiers
- Poor accountability mechanism
- Short term view of anti-corruption war

Institutional

- Frustration and collusion by other arms of government
- the problem of weak capacity
- Inadequate material resources
- Selective anti-graft war
- Internal Resistance to reforms
- Hostility towards, and victimization of ACTUs officials
- Leadership selection process
- Inadequate staff development
- Poor Intervention design
- Inadequate spread
- Inadequate technical assistance from donors
- Non-robust institutional framework
- Competitive nature of anti-corruption initiative

Finance

- Underfunding of ACAs
- Under funding of (ACTUs)
- 

Legal

- Constitutional loopholes
- Ineffective criminal justice system
- The Immunity clause
- Constitutional ambiguity
- obstructive criminal justice system
- limited powers
- Outdated laws
- The plea bargain rule
- Abuse of judicial system
- Non-independence of the judiciary

Political

- Poor political will
- Political elite Negative impact/constraints
- Undermining of ACAs capacity
- External Resistance to reforms
- Limited independence/ autonomy
- Ineffective oversight
- The nature of the state





# Recommendations...

- ✓ Adopt radical punitive measures such as introduction of the death penalty, life imprisonment without an option of fine, and ban from holding public offices in any arm or tier of government for life even when granted state pardon.
- ✓ Change mind-set/ perception of both public office holders and the citizens through deliberate national re-orientation as to the true meaning of public service. For public office holders to mean service to the people and not “working for your pocket”, and for the citizens, from “let them eat today, it may be my turn tomorrow” mentality to expecting qualitative, timely, efficient and fair service delivery
- ✓ Address anti-corruption initiatives design-reality gaps to have ‘local fit and strategic fit’



- ✓ Adopt the name and shame approach by establishing 'Looters Register' to serve as deterrent
- ✓ Urgently restructure the criminal justice system to be more result-oriented.
- ✓ Ensure regular/timely publication of Public Account Committee Reports.
- ✓ Improve citizens' participation in anti-graft war by actively involving the people, CSO's, NGO's, religious and traditional institutions.
- ✓ Go global, but act local by following the spirit of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003), as well as the UN Convention against Corruption (2003)



- ✓ Abolish the existing plea-bargain option. Let offenders face the full wroght of the law.
- ✓ Granting ACAs' absolute autonomy. This will enable them the independence of independent prosecution without seeking presidential approval.
- ✓ ACAs should focus more on preventive-type instead of enforcement-type intervention.
- ✓ Government need to demonstrate increased 'strong' political will to fight public service corruption.
- ✓ Accept the picture in the 'Mirror'



# Conclusion

- ❖ Public sector corruption has been identified as the cankerworm stalling Africa's development strides.
- ❖ It has led to missed opportunities, pervasion of morals, norms and ethical values, led to social tension and the crippling of virtually all sectors of our national life – economic, political, social, cultural religious and traditional life.
- ❖ Multifaceted approach has been adopted in combating corruption over the decades, however, not much has been achieved but, rather, the menace has become so deep-rooted that most citizens now see it as 'normal'.



# Conclusion

- ❖ Therefore, there is the need now, more than ever before, to ensure the deliberate strengthening of public service corporate governance structure if our collective development aspirations – SDGs and Agenda 2063 are to be achieved.
- ❖ This will no doubt require fashioning out and implementing a pragmatic anti-corruption initiative plan across the continent.
- ❖ Always remember the words of the late Afro-beat Maestro, Fela Anikulapo-Kuti:  
“AUTHORITY STEALING (PEN-ROBBERY) WORSE PASS ARMED-ROBBERY”



## **FACES OF CORRUPTION**

**IN AFRICA:**

**The faces of men**

**accused of stealing a  
goat in the village and a**

**man accused of stealing**

**billions of community**

**funds....**





**Thank you for your attention**